State v. Alfaro Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 38500 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-9-2013
State v. Alfaro Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38500
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Alfaro Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38500" (2013). Not Reported. 172.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/172
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) NO. 38500 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Canyon Co. Case No. 
vs. ) CR-2009-26795 
) 
MICHAEL ALFARO, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
_____________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
OPY 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
HONORABLE THOMAS J. RYAN 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
DAPHNEJ.HUANG 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise1 Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
ROBYN FYFFE 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & 
Bartlett 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ................................... 1 
ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 4 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 5 
I. Alfaro Has Failed To Demonstrate That The Record 
From The Five Day Trial Lacks Substantial And 
Competent Evidence To Support The Jury's Findings 
and Verdict. ................................................................................ 5 
A. Standard Of Review ........................................................ 5 
B. Ample Competent Evidence Through Witness 
Testimonies Supports The Jury's Factual Findings 
And Verdict Beyond A Reasonable Doubt.. ..................... 6 
II. Alfaro Has Failed To Show That Any Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, Or Any Error Or Irregularity Infringed On 
His Right To A Fair Trial. ............................................................ 8 
A. Legal Standard ................................................................ 8 
B. Alfaro Has Not Shown That The Prosecutor's 
Rebuttal Comment Was Either Improper Or Harmful. ..... 9 
C. Alfaro Has Not Shown Cumulative Error ....................... 11 
Ill. Alfaro Has Failed To Establish That The District Court 
Imposed His Sentence With Intent To Punish Him For 
Exercising His Right To Trial, Thus Denying Him Due 
Process .................................................................................... 12 
A. Standard Of Review ...................................................... 13 
B. Alfaro Has Not Shown That The District Court 
Imposed His Sentence Based On An Intent To 
Punish Alfaro For Exercising His Right To Trial. ............ 13 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 15 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ......................................................................... 15 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 107 S.Ct 3102 (1987) ............................................ 9 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007) ........................................... 11 
State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 189 P.3d 477 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................... 9 
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 99 P.3d 1069 (2004) ....................................... 5, 7 
State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 229 P.3d 1174 (Ct. App. 2010) .......................... 13 
State v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269, 270 P.3d 1054 (Ct. App. 2011) ................... 8 
Statev. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,254 P.3d 77 (Ct. App. 2011) ........................ 9, 10 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) ................................ 8, 10, 11 
State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 253 P.3d 310 (2011) ............................... 12, 15 
Stedtfeld v. State, 114 Idaho 273,755 P.2d 1311 (Ct. App. 1988) ........ 12, 13, 14 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 18-204 ....................................................................................................... 12 
I.C. § 18-906 ....................................................................................................... 12 
I.C. § 18-4004 ..................................................................................................... 12 
I.C. § 19-1430 ..................................................................................................... 12 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Alfaro appeals his conviction for aid and abet first degree murder, 
two counts of aid and abet aggravated assault, and aid and abet unlawful 
discharge of a weapon at a residence. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The evening before August 14, 2004, Michael Alfaro met with Richard 
Alaniz. (Trial Tr., p. 566, L. 13 - p. 568, L. 20.) They drank beers and talked 
about how Alaniz's house had been the subject of drive-by shootings by the 
gang known as the Westside Lomas. (Trial Tr. p. 568, Ls. 6-9; p. 570, Ls. 16-
23.) Then they started driving around "in case [they] ran into somebody, a rival 
gang." (Trial Tr. p. 568, Ls. 19-20.) Alfaro was behind the wheel. (Trial Tr., p. 
568, Ls. 16-17.) Alfaro and Alaniz stopped at the house of Mario Flores, and 
picked up Arandu Maceda and Evan Musquiz. (Trial Tr., p. 568, L. 19 - p. 569, 
L. 18.) All four were associated with the gang known as the Eastside Locos. 
(Trial Tr., p. 570, L. 24 - p. 571, L. 9; p. 635, Ls. 6-12.) 
The summer of 2004 was notorious for drive-by shootings between the 
rival gangs. (Trial Tr., p. 411, L. 21 - p. 413, L. 11.) That early morning of 
August 14, Alfaro, Alaniz, Maceda and Musquiz drove by a house where Javier 
Rodriguez - known to be Westside - lived. (Trial Tr., p. 572, L 12 - p. 573, L. 
14; p. 589, L. 21 - p. 590, L. 3; p. 51, Ls. 23-25.) Three people were outside, 
including Rodriguez and Sael Castillo. (Trial Tr., p. 34, Ls. 6-8; p. 572, Ls. 4-15.) 
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Alfaro slowed the car and turned out the lights. (Trial Tr., p. 33, Ls. 18-21; 
p. 572, Ls. 7-24.) Then Maceda and Alaniz fired weapons at the house, while 
Musquiz, only 13 at the time, ducked down in the car. (Trial Tr., p. 148, Ls. 13-
17; p. 157, Ls. 5-14; p. 573, L. 7-14.) Rodriguez fired shots back. (Trial Tr., p. 
34, Ls. 21-25.) A bullet penetrated the kitchen window of Rodriguez's house, 
and hit Carlos Chavez - who had gone inside for a snack - in the neck. (Trial 
Tr., p. 274, Ls. 23-25; p. 296, Ls. 13-23; p. 326, Ls. 4-7; p. 376, Ls. 4-6.) Alfaro 
sped away. (Trial Tr., p. 157, Ls. 9-14.) Rodriguez tried to stop Chavez's blood 
loss, and called 911. (Trial Tr., p. 74, L. 22 - p. 75, L. 6; p. 118, Ls. 1-9.) 
Chavez was taken to the emergency room, then later transported to Boise for 
surgery. (Trial Tr., p. 271, Ls. 4-5; p. 275, Ls. 11-12; p. 437, Ls. 20-23.) He died 
two weeks later. (Trial Tr., p. 271, L. 4 - p. 272, L 15.) 
Initially, no witnesses cooperated with definitive information. (Trial Tr., p. 
383, L. 8 - p. 384, L. 11.) In June 2005, Musquiz came forward. (Trial Tr., p. 
194, L. 1 - p. 195, L. 18.) The state filed its first indictments in August 2009. 
(R., pp. 6-11.) Ultimately, Alfaro was charged with four counts in the shooting 
incident that left Chavez dead: one count of aid and abet first degree murder or 
involuntary manslaughter; two counts of aid and abet aggravated assault; and 
one count of aid and abet unlawful discharge of a firearm at a dwelling house. 
(R., pp. 90-94.) 
A jury found Alfaro guilty of aid and abet first degree murder or involuntary 
manslaughter, both counts of aid and abet aggravated assault, and aid and abet 
unlawful discharge of a firearm at a dwelling house. (R., pp. 143-45.) Alfaro was 
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sentenced to 20 years fixed with a subsequent indeterminate period up to life in 
prison on count one, five years fixed on count two, five years fixed on count 
three, and five years fixed on count four, each to run concurrently. (R., pp. 161-
63.) 
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ISSUES 
Michael Alfaro states the issues on appeal as: 
A Did the prosecutor's misconduct in closing argument deprive 
Mr. Alfaro of his right to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution? 
B. Was there constitutionally sufficient evidence to support the 
verdict? 
C. Did the combination of errors and irregularities deprive Mr. 
Alfaro of his due process right to a fair trial? 
D. Did the district court abuse its discretion and violate Mr. 
Alfaro's right to trial and due process by sentencing him 
more harshly for exercising his right to trial? 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Alfaro failed to demonstrate that the record from the five day trial 
lacks substantial and competent evidence to support the jury's findings 
and verdict? 
2. Has Alfaro failed to show that prosecutorial misconduct, or any error or 
irregularity, infringed on his due process right to a fair trial? 
3. Has Alfaro failed to establish that the district court imposed his sentence 
with intent to punish him for exercising his right to trial, thus denying him 
due process? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Alfaro Has Failed To Demonstrate That The Record From The Five Day Trial 
Lacks Substantial And Competent Evidence To Support The Jury's Findings and 
Verdict 
In the summer of 2004, the violent rivalry between Eastside and Westside 
gangs in Caldwell, Idaho wrought a torrent of drive-by shootings. Michael Alfaro, 
Richard Alaniz, Arandu Maceda, and Evan Musquiz were Eastside. Javier 
Rodriguez, Sael Castillo, and Carlos Chavez were Westside. On August 14, 
2004, the four Eastsiders did a drive-by of Rodriguez's house. Alfaro drove. 
Alaniz and Maceda fired weapons. Rodriguez fired back. Chavez was hit and 
killed. The story is simple. 
Alfaro argues that the evidence is constitutionally insufficient to support 
. his convictions. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-16.) However, review of the record 
shows that the verdicts are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
A. Standard Of Review 
Alfaro filed Rule 29 motions for acquittal both after the close of the state's 
case, and after the jury returned a guilty verdict. (Trial Tr., p. 620, L. 7 - p. 626, 
L. 1; R. 146-47.) The district court denied both motions. (Trial Tr., p. 626, Ls. 4-
22; R. 148-54.) In reviewing the denial of a Rule 29 motion, the appellate court 
considers whether there was substantial evidence to support the factual findings 
and verdict below. State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 684, 99 P.3d 1069, 1074 
(2004). Evidence is substantial if "a reasonable mind could conclude that the 
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defendant's guilt as to such material evidence of the offense was proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt." lg_. (citation omitted). Where there is competent but 
conflicting evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict, the appellate court will not 
reweigh the evidence or disturb the verdict. lg_. Also, all reasonable inferences 
must be taken in favor of the prosecution. lg_. 
B. Ample Competent Evidence Through Witness Testimonies Supports The 
Jury's Factual Findings And Verdict Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
As outlined above, the facts in this case are straightforward. Testimonies 
of Alaniz and Musquiz demonstrate that they participated in a drive-by shooting 
in the early morning hours of August 14, 2004, in which Alfaro was the driver. 
(Trial Tr., p. 149, L. 6 - p. 157, L. 14; p. 567, L. 6 - p. 573, L. 24.) Alaniz 
testified that the house that they shot at was Rodriguez's. (Trial Tr., p. 573, L. 25 
- p. 57 4, L. 18.) Castillo and Rodriguez testified that they were at Rodriguez's 
house that early morning when they were shot at, and Chavez was killed. (Trial 
Tr., p. 29, L. 1 - p. 34, L. 25; p. 109, L. 2 - p. 113, L. 18.) Those testimonies 
were consistent with that of Detective Scott, who responded to the call 
immediately following the shooting. (Trial Tr., p. 293, L. 18 - p. 301, L. 7.) 
Alfaro argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury's findings 
and verdict; in support, he highlights differences in details of witness accounts, 
such as the vehicle's color, whether the vehicle turned around, or the exact time 
of the drive-by. (Appellant's brief, p. 13-16.) At best, Alfaro has established 
conflicts in the testimonies. But, absent a showing that evidence lacks 
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competence, conflicts provide inadequate basis to disturb a jury's factual 
findings. Hoyle, 140 Idaho at 684, 99 P.3d at 1074. 
In this case, it is undisputed that the drive-by shooting occurred at night. 
(Trial Tr., p. 29, L. 1 - p. 34, L. 25; p. 109, L. 19 - p. 113, L. 18; p. 583, Ls. 1-3.) 
Most, if not all of those involved in the shooting had been drinking alcohol. (Trial 
Tr., p. 29, Ls. 5-19; p. 120, Ls. 1-5; p. 152, L. 20 - p. 153, L. 15; p. 568, Ls. 10-
13.) And the shooting took place six years before the witnesses testified at trial. 
Given these factors, the variation in witnesses' details of the night is 
unremarkable. 
Significantly, Alfaro acknowledges the jury properly concluded that Alfaro, 
Alaniz, Musquiz, and Maceda drove-by Rodriguez's house and fired shots "at 
some point in time." (Appellant's brief, p. 14.) Essentially, Alfaro concedes that 
the witnesses' testimonies as to the critical facts were competent. Alfaro then 
argues that the evidence does not show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that his 
drive-by shooting of Rodriguez's house was the same drive-by shooting that 
resulted in Chavez's death. (Appellant's brief, p. 14.) That the jury held no such 
lingering doubt is entirely reasonable. The testimonies of Alaniz, Musquiz, 
Castillo, Rodriguez, and Wright provided ample competent evidence for the jury 
to conclude - beyond a reasonable doubt - that Chavez was shot and ultimately 
killed in Alfaro's drive-by. 
Alfaro has failed to demonstrate that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the jury's factual findings and verdict. The Court should thus reject 
Alfaro's first argument. 
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11. 
Alfaro Has Failed To Show That Any Prosecutorial Misconduct, Or Any Error Or 
Irregularity Infringed On His Right To A Fair Trial 
After Alfaro's counsel's closing statement, the prosecutor said in his 
rebuttal, "We just went on an hour-long red herring fishing trip." (Trial Tr., p. 824, 
Ls. 2-3.) Alfaro's counsel objected. (Trial Tr., p. 824, L. 4.) Alfaro argues on 
appeal that the prosecutor's comment was misconduct that infringed on his right 
to a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-13.) Both parties are given considerable 
latitude in making closing arguments to the jury. State v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 
269, 271, 270 P.3d 1054, 1056 (Ct. App. 2011 ). Alfaro argues that the 
prosecutor exceeded the scope of that latitude. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-13.) 
Given the record here, this argument is unsupported by Idaho law. 
A Legal Standard 
On appeal, where a defendant asserts prosecutorial misconduct followed 
by a contemporaneous objection, the appellate court first determines whether 
the prosecutor's conduct was improper. .!.g_. at 272, 270 P.3d at 1057. If 
improper, the court evaluates the misconduct for harmless error . .!.g_. An error is 
harmless if the appellate court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did 
not contribute to the verdict. .!.g_. (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 219-20, 
245 P.3d 961, 971-72 (2010)). Where prosecutorial misconduct is of such 
significance as to impair the defendant's right to a fair trial, it amounts to a 
constitutional due process violation. Marmentini, 152 Idaho at 271-72, 270 P.3d 
8 
at 1056-57 (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765, 107 S.Ct 3102, 3108-09 
(1987)). 
B. Alfaro Has Not Shown That The Prosecutor's Rebuttal Comment Was 
Either Improper Or Harmful 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has found that statements disparaging 
defense counsel are improper. State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 19, 189 P.3d 477, 
481 (Ct. App. 2008). However, comments in rebuttal that characterize defense 
arguments and theories, but are not directed at defense counsel, are not 
improper. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,189,254 P.3d 77, 90 (Ct. App. 2011). 
Here, Alfaro contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
described defense counsel's closing argument as an "hour-long red herring 
fishing trip." (Appellant's brief, p. 11; Trial Tr., p. 824, Ls. 2-3.) According to 
Alfaro, this comment disparages counsel's entire closing argument. (Appellant's 
brief, p. 11.) 
Critically, Alfaro misstates Gross as holding that it is misconduct to 
disparage defense counsel's argument, rather than defense counsel. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 11.) Indeed, the holding in Gross as suggested by Alfaro 
would be difficult to reconcile with the Idaho Court of Appeals' holding in Norton. 
But as pronounced by the Idaho Court of Appeals, Gross and Norton are 
consistent; and under these cases, Alfaro's argument fails. 
In Norton, the Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor's references to 
defense arguments as "red herrings and smoke and mirrors" were not 
misconduct. Norton, 151 Idaho at 189, 254 P.3d at 90. In so holding, the court 
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specifically referenced the fact that the comments were not directed at defense 
counsel personally, but at counsel's theories. Id. Alfaro argues that Norton 
should be limited to its facts and deemed inapplicable here. (Appellant's brief, p. 
11.) To the contrary, Norton controls given the facts here. 
As in Norton, the comment challenged by Alfaro was directed at defense 
counsel's theories presented in closing, and not defense counsel himself. (Trial 
Tr., p. 824, Ls. 2-3.) Despite Alfaro's suggestion otherwise, the fact that the 
comments in Norton concerned some and not all of defense counsel's closing 
(Appellant's brief, p. 11 ), is immaterial. The Norton court's holding focused on 
the subject of the disparagement, not the quantity of arguments disparaged. 
Norton, 151 Idaho at 189, 254 P.3d at 90. A holding that attempts to quantify a 
prosecution's disparagement, as suggested by Alfaro, would be impractical to 
apply. A simpler reading of Norton, centered on what is being disparaged, 
should govern. Here, because the prosecutor's comment was directed at 
defense arguments rather than defense counsel, it was not improper. 
Finally, the absence of an objection to the prosecutor's comment in 
Norton does not distinguish it here. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, 
absent a contemporaneous objection to the disputed conduct, a defendant must 
show fundamental error in addition to showing that the conduct was improper, 
and that harm resulted. Perry. 150 Idaho at 219, 245 P.3d at 971. Thus, by 
failing to object, the defendant in Norton had to show fundamental error as well 
as impropriety and harm, to establish misconduct. Although the Norton court did 
not address whether there was fundamental error, it nonetheless concluded that 
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there was no misconduct. Norton, 151 Idaho at 189, 254 P.3d at 90. Under 
Norton, whether or not Alfaro objected, the prosecutor's comments were not 
misconduct. 
There being no misconduct, the Court need not address whether there 
was harm. But even if the Court were to address this question, the 
overwhelming evidence, as discussed herein, supports that the jury reached its 
verdict without relying upon the prosecution's comment in closing rebuttal. For 
these reasons, the Court should reject Alfaro's argument that he was denied a 
fair trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. 
C. Alfaro Has Not Shown Cumulative Error 
The accumulation of errors or irregularities that deprives a defendant of a 
fair trial amounts to a due process violation. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572-
73, 165 P.3d 273, 286-87 (2007). Alfaro raises a cumulative error argument, as 
an added legal theory, but without additional factual basis. Because Alfaro has 
not established any errors or irregularities that have deprived him of a fair trial, 
his cumulative error argument also fails. See Field, 144 Idaho at 572-73, 165 
P.3d at 286-87. 
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111. 
Alfaro Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Imposed His Sentence 
With Intent To Punish Him For Exercising His Right To Trial, Thus Denying Him 
Due Process 
The jury found Alfaro guilty on four counts for which he was charged. (R., 
pp. 143-45.) On the count of aid and abet first degree murder, the district court 
sentenced Alfaro to a minimum of 20 years, and a subsequent indeterminate 
period of life in prison. (R, p. 162.) As to each of the two counts of aid and abet 
aggravated assault, the district court sentenced Alfaro to five years fixed. (Id.) 
And on count four, aid and abet unlawful discharge of a firearm at a dwelling 
house, the district court sentenced Alfaro to five years fixed. The court ordered 
the sentences to run concurrently. (Id.) Each sentence is squarely within 
statutory limits. I.C. §§ 18-4004, 19-1430, 18-204, 18-906. Alfaro does not 
contend otherwise. 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant-defendant 
challenging that sentence must demonstrate that the court clearly abused its 
discretion. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011) 
(citation omitted). Alfaro argues that the district court abused its discretion and 
violated his due process rights by sentencing him more harshly than co-
defendants because he exercised his right to trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-18.) 
In support, Alfaro correctly cites the legal standard in Stedtfeld v. State, 114 
Idaho 273,276,755 P.2d 1311, 1314 (Ct. App. 1988). But Alfaro then ignores 
Stedtfeld's analysis and conclusion, which directly apply here. 
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A Standard Of Review 
A sentencing court cannot impose a harsher sentence on a defendant "for 
putting the state to its burden of proof and exercising the right to trial." State v. 
Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 814, 229 P.3d 1174, 1176 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing 
Stedtfeld, 114 Idaho at 276, 755 P.2d at 1314). To show that due process rights 
have been violated at sentencing, a petitioner must demonstrate "the judge's 
vindictiveness or intent to punish him for exercising his rights." Stedtfeld, 114 
Idaho at 276, 755 P.2d at 1314 (citation omitted). In determining whether a 
judge was vindictive in imposing sentence, the reviewing court looks to "the 
totality of circumstances and examine[s] the words and actions of the judge as a 
whole." lg. 
B. Alfaro Has Not Shown That The District Court Imposed His Sentence 
Based On An Intent To Punish Alfaro For Exercising His Right To Trial 
Alfaro points to no evidence that the district judge intended to punish 
Alfaro for exercising his right to trial. Indeed, there is no such evidence. Instead, 
Alfaro notes that the district judge sentenced co-defendant Alaniz to a lesser 
sentence - a unified term of 15 years with a minimum of six. (Sentencing Tr., p. 
30, Ls. 17-25.) However, "a disparity in sentencing among co-defendants in the 
same criminal activity does not make the harsher sentence per se excessive or 
an abuse of discretion." Stedtfeld, 114 Idaho at 276, 755 P.2d at 1314 (citation 
omitted). Here, the disparity between Alaniz's and Alfaro's sentences is 
attributable to the negotiated sentence-reduction for Alaniz's cooperation, not an 
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improper inflation of Alfaro's sentence for going to trial. (Sent. Tr., p. 32, Ls. 2-
24.) Alfaro ignores this; for his argument to succeed, one must ignore it. 
Looking at the totality of circumstances, including the court's words and 
actions as a whole, there is no support for Alfaro's argument that the sentencing 
court intended to punish him for exercising his right to trial. See Stedtfeld, 114 
Idaho at 276, 755 P.2d at 1314. The district court expressed that Alaniz's and 
Musquiz's bargained-for sentences "did not create a situation of justice." (Sent. 
Tr., p. 54, L. 25 - p. 55, L. 2.) Contrary to Alfaro's arguments, the court made no 
comment or even suggestion that the length of Alfaro's sentence was intended to 
redress the court's frustration over Alfaro's exercise of his right to trial. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 17-18.) 
The district court expressed concern about how to reconcile the inevitable 
disparity between Alaniz's and Musquiz's sentences, and Alfaro's sentence. 
(Sent. Tr., p. 55, Ls. 3-8.) Ultimately, the court imposed Alfaro's 20 year 
minimum sentence based on the sentencing considerations prescribed by law: 
protection of society, 1 deterrence,2 retribution, 3 and even rehabilitation.4 
1 The court addressed societal protection as an overarching concern. (Sent. Tr., 
r· 55, L. 8 -p. 56, L. 21.) 
As to deterrence, "[Tjhere needs to be a message sent out to these small 
groups of individuals that live in our community that we cannot allow this to 
happen." (Sent. Tr., p. 55, Ls. 13-16.) 
3 As to retribution, "It is the most heinous crime ... and it needs to be treated 
that way .... We're sick and tired of it. And the rest of us that live law-abiding 
lives in this community cannot be living in fear .... " (Sent. Tr., p. 55, Ls. 12-18.) 
4 As to rehabilitation, "[Y]ou're 31 years of age. . . .You will be a much younger 
man than I having served that 20 years. But in this court's view that is a fair 
sentence giving full regard to the protection of the community, giving full regard 
to the criteria set forth in 19-2521." (Sent. Tr., p. 56, Ls. 15-21.) 
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Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253 P.3d at 313. 
Alfaro has failed to identify any support for his argument that the district 
court sentenced him as punishment for exercising his right to trial. The Court 
should therefore reject his final argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Alfaro has failed to establish any valid grounds for appeal, thus his 
appeal must be denied. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2013. 
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